We explore if the Knowledge Spillover Theory of Entrepreneurship, applied to FDI, provides at least a partial explanation for the greater emergence of recent knowledgebased entrepreneurship in Ireland compared with Wales. In order to examine how FDI and entrepreneurship policy in these two regions might have influenced the levels of knowledge-based entrepreneurship, we outline FDI and entrepreneurship policies for Wales and Ireland and key measures of knowledge creation, and evaluate the extent and nature of FDI activity and its relationship with entrepreneurship in general and knowledge-based entrepreneurship in particular. Implications include possible policy directions for countries that are characterized by weak knowledge-creating institutions yet wish to encourage knowledge-based entrepreneurship. JEL-classification: J24, L26, M13, 03
INTRODUCTION
According to the knowledge spillover theory of entrepreneurship, low levels of knowledge-based entrepreneurship might result from two factors: (1) failure of private firms and public institutions to generate new knowledge; and (2) failure of individuals to exploit that new knowledge. First, the absence of an indigenous industry base and/or the absence of domestic knowledge-creating institutions, such as public research institutes, might militate against the emergence of knowledge-based entrepreneurship.
Second, according to the knowledge spillover theory of entrepreneurship, individuals may fail to commercialise new knowledge via entrepreneurship. Individuals with new knowledge might under invest in commercialization activity as they do not see the benefits, or fail in their attempts to commercialize, due to a lack of market knowledge. Those individuals or organizations with market knowledge or other resources may not be aware of the new knowledge, and therefore fail to invest, or under-invest, in the knowledge or in new firms (ACS et al., 2006) . There are a variety of possible policy responses to these two problems. In terms of the absence of domestic knowledge-creating capacity, policy makers might seek to attract inward foreign direct investment (FDI) . FDI enables the transfer of intangibles to another country and also makes knowledge spillovers possible and therefore may play a role in industrial development and entrepreneurship. In today's global knowledge economy, firms are interested in operating in countries in which they can take advantage of strategic assets, especially intangibles such as information and human capital. Internalization theory describes how local firms' knowledge of laws and relationships with local players provide 'home court advantages'. Foreign firms must therefore leverage special advantages, often information-based intangibles, in order to compete in these markets (MORCK and YEUNG, 1992) . During the course of these FDI activities, there is a transfer of technology and intangibles to the host country that involves people and machinery, and some of this knowledge spills over.
As different types of FDI enable different levels of knowledge spillovers, we expect that entrepreneurial activity will be more pervasive in sectors where entrepreneurs are exploiting opportunities relating to MNE economic activity (ACS and VARGA, 2005) . We argue that the emergence of knowledge-based entrepreneurship can, at least in part, be understood in terms of how regional public policy supports the creation and exploitation of knowledge through a combination of FDI and entrepreneurship policy. Given COOKE et al.'s (2003) finding that more successful core regions tend to have 'entrepreneurial' innovation systems, whilst less successful peripheral regions have 'institutional' ones , this may highlight, for example, that the nature of entrepreneurship policy and the extent of its integration with FDI policy influences the emergence of knowledge-based entrepreneurship.
In a previous paper, ACS et al. (2007) examined the relationship between entrepreneurship and foreign direct investment in developed and developing countries. The purpose of this paper is to extend this research to examine if The Knowledge Spillover Theory of Entrepreneurship applied to FDI can provide an explanation (or at least part of it) for differences in the levels and nature of knowledge-based entrepreneurship in Ireland compared with Wales. As the emergence of knowledge-based entrepreneurship is influenced by many factors and as there may be a significant time lag between policy choices and the influence on entrepreneurship, we choose the case method as the most appropriate method for our study. We present Ireland and Wales as case studies, which we then compare.
Ireland and Wales offer a 'natural experiment' for exploring the impact of policy on the emergence of knowledge-based entrepreneurship. Both are similar in that they have traditionally been seen as relatively small, peripheral economies. Ireland has a population of approximately four million in Ireland and three million live in Wales. Both economies share a long history of FDI attraction and an absence of a strong indigenous industry and general R&D base. Both Ireland and Wales spend only around 1.1% of their GDP on R&D, compared with an OECD average of 2.25% (OECD, 2006a) , as illustrated in Table 1. However, the two countries today differ significantly in terms of economic performance, with Ireland often described as the "Celtic Tiger" 1 , whilst Wales' relative GDP per head has dropped steadily over the last 20 years. 
KNOWLEDGE SPILLOVER THEORY OF ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND ITS RELATIONSHIP

WITH FDI
The Knowledge Spillover Theory of Entrepreneurship relaxes two central (and unrealistic) assumptions of ROMER's (1990) endogenous growth model. The first is that knowledge is automatically equated with economic knowledge. In fact as ARROW (1962) emphasized, knowledge is inherently different from the traditional factors of production, resulting in a gap between knowledge (K) and what he termed economic knowledge (K c ). The second involves the assumed spillover of knowledge. The existence of the factor of knowledge is equated with its automatic spillover, yielding endogenous growth.
In the Knowledge Spillover Theory of Entrepreneurship, institutions impose a gap between new knowledge and economic knowledge (0< K c /K<1) and results in a lower level of knowledge spillovers (ACEMOGLU et al., 2004) .
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The degree to which economic agents recognize entrepreneurial opportunities emanating from knowledge spillovers and the decision to commercialize them through the startup of a new firm is captured by the equation reflecting entrepreneurial choice, 
The opportunity space for potential entrepreneurs is thus dependent on the efficiency of incumbents in exploiting new knowledge who are assumed incapable of fully exhausting the opportunities provided by new knowledge. Equation (2) implicitly assumes away any institutional or individual barriers to entrepreneurship. Yet, as a rich literature suggests (PARKER, 2004) , there is a compelling array of financial, institutional, and individual barriers to entrepreneurship, which result in a modification of the entrepreneurial choice equation,
where β represents those institutional and individual barriers to entrepreneurship, spanning factors such as financing constraints, risk aversion, legal restrictions, bureaucratic and red tape constraints, labor market rigidities, lack of social acceptance, etc. While we do not explicitly specify these specific entrepreneurial barriers, we note that they span a broad spectrum of institutional and individual characteristics which, when taken together, constitute barriers to entrepreneurship. The existence of such barriers, i.e., a high value of β, explains why economic agents would choose not to enter into entrepreneurship, even when confronted with knowledge that would otherwise generate a potentially profitable opportunity. Based on this simple model originating in standard assumptions applied in microeconomics, we present the following two propositions:
Proposition 1: An increase in the stock of knowledge has a positive effect on the degree of entrepreneurship. The extent of the impact is however determined by the efficiency of incumbents to exploit knowledge: the more efficient incumbents are, the smaller is θ and the smaller the effect of new knowledge on entrepreneurship.
Proposition 2: Entrepreneurial activities are decreasing in higher regulations, administrative barriers and governmental market intervention. How can this model be applied to FDI? First, FDI directed at export will embody the latest technology and be the most valuable. Domestic R&D might lag in its commercial ability. There are several differences with knowledge coming through FDI. The first difference is that if knowledge comes from FDI the difference between (0< K c /K<1) for domestic knowledge investment, then for FDI that is already focused on production K c /K should be equal to unity since all of the knowledge will be exploited by the new investment. If all knowledge is exploited, no knowledge will be left over to be exploited by entrepreneurs. FDI to generate knowledge spillovers needs to create a gap between K c /K or θ needs to be greater than zero. One way to create a gap between K c /K is to have FDI invest in R&D facilities that produces knowledge that might not be commercialized. A second approach is to increase domestic R&D (K) in such a way as to produce a wedge between K c /K. The gap between K c /K creates the opportunities for generating knowledge spillovers that might lead to entrepreneurial startups. The next section examines how Ireland and Wales pursued such a strategy.
EVOLUTION OF FDI AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP POLICIES
Ireland: FDI and Entrepreneurship Development Policy
Ireland's recent economic success, earning it the label 'Celtic Tiger' was partially the result of four decades of pursuing an export-led industrial policy that relied on attracting inward FDI. Ireland is a world leader in "high-tech" business activity, with 46.5 percent of value-added in manufacturing from high technology companies (OECD, 1998), compared with 10% for the European Union and 16.4% for the United States. Ireland first started attracting export-oriented FDI inflows with the introduction, in the mid1950s, of a fifteen year 'tax holiday' on profits from export sales 2 . At the time the Irish government funded the state development agency's programs that built 'advanced factories' (purpose built factory accommodation for overseas firms) and provided generous capital grants to foreign firms. Such initiatives, aided by Ireland's entry into the European Economic Community in 1973, led to significant success in attracting inward FDI during the period from 1973 to 1980 (RUANE and GÖRG, 1996) .
However the oil shocks of the 1970s and ensuing global recession forced many foreign firms to close their operations in Ireland. In particular, labour-intensive firms involved in sectors such as man-made fibres, textiles, clothing and footwear determined that Ireland was no longer an attractive location (ACS et al., 2007) .
In response, Ireland's Industrial Development Authority (IDA) developed new policies that targeted 'flagship' emerging high technology sectors such as electronics, computer software, biotechnology and healthcare. Often, the IDA focused on relatively young firms in these new key sectors. The Irish government subsequently extended incentives to cover firms engaged in internationally traded services (e.g. financial services, call centres). Reflecting the nature of such activities and the policy objective of generating employment, firms received employment grants as well as capital grants (that is, payments per job created). In addition, a broad range of policy tools such as training grants, subsidized rents, technology transfer grants and low interest loans were used by the IDA to tailor packages that would be attractive to specific firm needs (MURPHY and RUANE, 2004) . The Irish government also sought to increase the flow of trained graduates to industry by creating new National Institutes of Higher Education (tertiary colleges with a focus on vocational skills). From the 1990s, the number of firms investing in Ireland increased significantly. In particular, there was a tremendous growth in the scale of FDI inflows from the US, and a growing proportion of FDI was directed to ICT sectors.
Ireland's success at attracting FDI also broadly reflects government commitment to the policy objective, government policy initiatives and instruments, and the IDA's extensive efforts. These policies evolved over time, as has the rationale for why firms elected to establish operations in Ireland (BEGLEY et al., 2005) . The key reasons why firms have chosen to locate in Ireland more recently include the following: low corporate tax regime, access to capital and employment grants, IDA lobbying, a probusiness regulatory environment and government, 'demonstration effects' and the availability, at a low cost, of a young, English-speaking, educated and trained workforce. Reviewing the effectiveness of policies aimed at attracting FDI, MURPHY and RUANE (2004:135) The WDA was particularly successful at attracting FDI in the electronics, automotive equipment and transport equipment sectors.
In pursuing this policy, Wales accessed UK government schemes such as the Regional Development Grant (RDG) and Regional Selective Assistance (RSA) programmes, and more recently to significant EU funds, between 1990 and 1997 receiving £890m in Regional Preferential Assistance (RPA) to industry, a third of the UK total and a quarter of UK RSA spending . Unsurprisingly, research focused on the association among these relatively high levels of RPA to industry in Wales, infrastructure development and the disproportionately high share of inward investment that the region has received (HILL and MUNDAY, 1992; JONES 1996) . More specifically the reasons for the WDA's success at attracting inward FDI include the presence of the following: grant-assisted areas close to the rich markets of the South East of England, a plentiful, and cheap, source of semi-skilled labour, and good road infrastructure (MUNDAY and ROBERTS, 2001 ). In 1998 there was a change in focus with the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI, 1998) stating that the RSAs would now focus support on high quality, knowledge-based projects that provided skilled jobs. However there is evidence to suggest that, following these changes, the key reasons for foreign re-investment were still predominantly linked to labour skills and costs and government assistance, with only a minor role for local suppliers, partnerships and training, and virtually no impact from local technology transfer activities or links with local research institutions (PHELPS et al., 2003) . investors supported by grant aid in the 1990s were from the US, followed by significant inward investment from the rest of Europe and Japan PHELPS et al., 2003) . In terms of direct employment, the WELSH OFFICE (1997) indicated that foreign firms employed around 75,000 in manufacturing, over a third of the total manufacturing workforce. Table 2 about here * The two countries also differ in terms of the nature of FDI. In Wales, however, there is a relative paucity of higher-level functions in industries populated by foreign firms. ROBERTS (1996) found in Wales almost 77% of employees in foreign firms were operatives or assembly workers, compared to the UK FDI average of 60% (CSO, 1992) . Given that 48%
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of the Welsh workforce were in manual occupations at the time when FDI was at its height (Regional Trends, 1996) , it is clear that FDI in Wales was not relatively concentrated in the higher paid non-manual occupations as a result of FDI. MORGAN (1991) also concluded that Wales was particularly afflicted by the "branch plant" economy model in electronics due to the lack of R&D carried out by inward investors in Wales. Multinationals based in Wales were able to spatially separate assembly from higher level functions such as R&D.
Furthermore, there are relatively low levels of R&D activity among foreign firms in Wales. For example, in terms of the automotive component sector, CLIFTON et al.'s (2000) survey of Welsh first tier automotive suppliers reported that 23% of UK firms, and 40% of non-UK firms do not locate R&D activities in Wales. Another study reports that fifty-two percent of firms conduct some research, design and development activity on site, though the predominant focus is routine activities such as product testing and adaptation (PHELPS et al., 2003) . Higher level R&D tended to emerge from the parent company or other international sources, with only 2-4% developed with local linkages (e.g. universities, research institutions, innovative SMEs) (PHELPS et al., 2003) .
While there are on-going concerns in both Ireland and Wales about the embeddedness of foreign firms, presence of strategic functions, and closure and relocation of firms to lower cost locations, it is evident that the two regions attracted different FDI profiles. It is perhaps unsurprising, therefore, that comparing the nature of early stage entrepreneurial activity (ESE) to the nature of FDI for Ireland and Wales suggests that there may be links between FDI and subsequent entrepreneurial activity (Table 3) which differ between the two countries This seems particularly the case for the industries classed as knowledge-intensive (Eurostat definition) which are found predominantly in manufacture of equipment, electrical goods, vehicles, other manufacturing, transport and storage and business services. In these areas
Ireland and Wales both have concentrations of FDI activity (59.5% and 60.5% respectively). In Wales, however, FDI is concentrated in manufacturing, whereas the early stage entrepreneurship has been in services. In Ireland there has been a closer relationship between the location of knowledge-intensiverelated FDI and early-stage entrepreneurial activity. This is particularly true for high technology, knowledge-based entrepreneurship (both manufacturing and services), as is also shown in table 3.
There are also important differences in perceptions of entrepreneurial activity in Ireland and Wales, as illustrated in Table 3 . Differences in policy towards FDI as it relates to the knowledge-based spillover theory of entrepreneurship may be at least partly related to this, because of the higher status attached to the extent, nature and outcomes of entrepreneurial activities that result from knowledge-based as opposed to non-knowledge-based activities. Table 4 about here * Exploring the characteristics of entrepreneurs in Ireland and Wales, we identify a number of important differences. These differences also apply to entrepreneurs in Ireland and Wales in general and also specifically to knowledge-based entrepreneurs. Irish knowledge-based entrepreneurs are younger; more likely to be male, which might reflect the policy focus on raising female entrepreneurship in Wales; more educated than those in Wales (combining post secondary and post graduate categories), more growth-oriented ; and more export-oriented. Table 5 about here *
DISCUSSION
The results above suggest that the different policy foci in Ireland and Wales can provide at least a partial explanation for the differences in knowledge-intensive entrepreneurship, in terms of both its size and scope. The different entrepreneurial populations we identified may, for example, relate to policy foci in the two countries. The differences in profile (age, education, gender, growth, and exports) may reflect the much earlier and coordinated focus in Ireland on education, growth and export-based entrepreneurship, and linking to FDI and other knowledge-creating mechanisms. In Ireland there has been a concerted, consistent and simultaneous focus in both FDI and entrepreneurship development in complementary areas over the last two decades, related to export-led and knowledge-intensive sectors.
Irish entrepreneurship policy focuses more narrowly on 'high potential start-ups'. Irish entrepreneurs who received support tended to be well-educated and starting businesses in knowledge-based sectors such as software. Ireland's science and technology development policy specifically includes an integration of high-technology foreign firms into the economy, with development of high-technology indigenous firms, through attraction of high-level foreign firms functions, but also developing the innovation capability of indigenous firms to access, assimilate, absorb and adapt new technologies (JONES-EVANS, 2002).
In contrast, JONES-EVANS (2002) criticizes the lack of such a coherent science and technology policy for Wales. Instead, Wales targeted raising entrepreneurship levels more generally following the FDI-attraction focus of the 1980s and 1990s. Wales, unlike Ireland, did not pursue a linked and simultaneous strategy of FDI and entrepreneurship. Rather, until the late 1990s, Wales focused on FDI which assisted in the development of a regional innovation system (COOKE, 2003) . Wales' attention to entrepreneurship emerged more recently and there have been comparatively few attempts to link the two until relatively recently. There were many issues over resources. In Wales, the resources obtained by FDI on an ongoing basis raised an opportunity cost issue for entrepreneurship policy resources . COOKE (2003) also concludes that the Welsh Assembly Government's attempts to grapple with re-tracking the Welsh regional innovation system without large scale FDI attraction failed to foster entrepreneurship and innovation because of risk aversion, tight central control of budgets, and enterprise and innovation support instruments designed for public rather than private benefit. Welsh entrepreneurship priorities were also broader, with a focus on overall entrepreneurial activity and ultimately less policy resource on high-growth early stage entrepreneurship than originally planned.
While the effects of knowledge spillovers from MNEs into the local economy can be difficult to analyse specifically, GRÖG and STROBL (2002) Indigenous firms also benefit from investments in the tertiary education system that sought to produce graduates with skills suitable to attracting FDI (ACS et al., 2007) . In addition, 'on the job' learning in
MNEs in a broad range of sectors is important in developing the skills of the indigenous firms'
workforce. Also in some sectors populated by foreign-owned firms, there is also a direct increase in indigenous entrepreneurial activity. The most striking example can be found in the software sector in which both indigenous companies and Irish subsidiaries of MNEs achieved worldwide success.
In Wales, in contrast, the relative lack of higher level functions in foreign firms may have had deleterious effects on SME development, and knowledge-based entrepreneurship in particular. The shortage of such jobs forces potential employees to leave a region, reducing the pool of potential entrepreneurs and innovators (FIRN, 1975) . PHELPS et al. (2003) suggest only minimal local links in higher functional areas related to innovation in the pre-2003 period, though they also highlight that more focused recent initiatives targeted at a small number of inward investors may improve this situation. The
Source Wales initiative to improve local supply linkages did not have time to dramatically impact the situation, with a quarter of the plants having had links with this initiative (PHELPS et al., 2003) . Overall, as institutional initiatives develop, there is a better balance between inward investment and indigenous development, further emphasizing the relatively recent nature of initiatives to link the two (PHELPS et al., 2003) .
Prior to the end of the FDI boom, Wales began to generate a regional innovation system through supply chain integration and innovative cluster interactions in electronics and automotive components as multinationals became more locally embedded, with assistance from public subsidies (COOKE, 2003) .
This was not integrated with a specific policy of enterprise development. FDI in Wales was relatively innovative, and thus its declining presence weakened regional innovation in Wales generally, including that from SMEs in the supply chain (COOKE, 2003) . The relative lack of local sourcing (ROBERTS, 1996; MUNDAY and ROBERTS, 2001 ) may have limited the beneficial diffusion of management and production knowledge via buyer-supplier relations to SMEs in the supply chain. Beneficial resource transfers can take the form of importation of capital and technology as well as the diffusion of skills and techniques. Japanese electronics companies located in South Wales did not conduct many high-level functions and thus did not have a demand for skilled employees (MUNDAY, 1995 In these times where attraction of general FDI has become much more competitive (with the expansion of the EU into central and Eastern Europe and the opening up of China), Wales appears to require much more focused FDI-attraction polices that have greater potential to lead to spillovers that local entrepreneurs can then exploit. This will also, of course, require entrepreneurship policies that also encourage entrepreneurial activity among those with the resources and knowledge to exploit such knowledge spillovers. Crucially, of course, this will require these policies to be integrated both with each other and with science and technology policy more generally to increase levels of knowledge creation and utilisation, as highlighted exists in the Ireland situation by JONES-EVANS (2002) , in ways that may also support and initiate clusters.
More generally our results suggest that policy choices matter. Our analysis suggests that countries characterized by weak indigenous knowledge-creating regimes can at least partially compensate by attracting inward FDI and that, depending on the nature of this FDI and the nature of supporting policies, knowledge spillovers may lead to an increase in knowledge-based entrepreneurship. 
